Threat Actor Uses Fake CrowdStrike Recovery Manual to Deliver Unidentified Stealer

On July 22, 2024, CrowdStrike Intelligence identified a Word document containing macros that download an unidentified stealer now tracked as Daolpu. The document impersonates a Microsoft recovery manual.¹ Initial analysis suggests the activity is likely criminal.

Technical Analysis

Lure Document

The analyzed file,

New_Recovery_Tool_to_help_with_CrowdStrike_issue_impacting_Windows.docm

(SHA256 hash:

803727ccdf441e49096f3fd48107a5fe55c56c080f46773cd649c9e55ec1be61

), is a Word document containing malicious macros.

Upon execution, the macro retrieves a second-stage DLL from URL http[:]//172.104.160[.]126:8099/payload2.txt that is saved to %TMP%\mscorsvc.dll. On 22 July 2024, the URL served a file (SHA256 hash:

5eaf0f1c1d23f4372e24eb15ee969552c416a38dbc45e4f2b4af283e3bfb8721

) containing a Base64-encoded DLL that, when decoded, executes the novel stealer Daolpu.

A macro decodes the DLL using the Windows utility certutil, resulting in another DLL file (SHA256 hash:

4ad9845e691dd415420e0c253ba452772495c0b971f48294b54631e79a22644a

; build timestamp 2024-07-19 08:10:10 UTC). Then, the macro runs this DLL using rundll32 and calls the exported function DllMain.

Daolpu Stealer

Upon execution, Daolpu invokes taskkill /F /IM chrome.exe to kill the Chrome process. The malware then collects credentials such as login data and cookies stored in Chrome and Mozilla browsers.

The collected data is saved to %TMP%\result.txt and removed after exfiltration. The malware sends the result.txt file to the command-and-control (C2) server http[:]//172.104.160[.]126:5000/Uploadss in an HTTP POST request, which includes the system MAC address and hardcoded key Privatekey@2211#$.

Recommendations

• These recommendations can be implemented to help protect against the activity described in this report.
• Only communicate with CrowdStrike representatives through official channels and adhere to CrowdStrike support teams’ technical guidance
• Check websites’ certificates on the download page to ensure downloaded software originates from a legitimate source
• Train users to avoid executing files from untrusted sources
• Use browser settings to enable download protection that can issue warnings about potentially harmful websites or downloads
• Hunt for the file result.txt in %TMP%, which might indicate a Daolpu infection

Appendix

YARA Rule

This YARA rule detects host-based artifacts associated with the activity described in this report.

rule CrowdStrike_CSA_240838_01 : daolpu stealer 
{
    meta:
        copyright = "(c) 2024 CrowdStrike Inc."
        description = "C++ stealer delivered via Word documents with macros impersonating CS"
        reports = "CSA-240838"
        version = "202407221342"
        last_modified = "2024-07-22"
        malware_family = "Daolpu"
    strings:
        $ = "C:\\Windows\\Temp\\result.txt"
        $ = "D:\\c++\\Mal_Cookie_x64\\x64\\Release\\mscorsvc.pdb"
    condition:
        all of them
}

Falcon LogScale Queries

This Falcon LogScale Query detects the activity described in this report.

// hunting rule for indicators (CSA-240838)
case { in("SHA256HashData", values=["00199b4784533a124da96be5d5e472195b0e27be15007dcbd573c0fb29941d99", "3a9323a939fbecbc6d0ceb5c1e1f3ebde91e9f186b46fdf3ba1aee03d1d41cd8", "4ad9845e691dd415420e0c253ba452772495c0b971f48294b54631e79a22644a", "5eaf0f1c1d23f4372e24eb15ee969552c416a38dbc45e4f2b4af283e3bfb8721", "803727ccdf441e49096f3fd48107a5fe55c56c080f46773cd649c9e55ec1be61"]); in("RemoteAddressIP4", values=["172.104.160.126"]) } | table([cid, aid, #event_simpleName, ComputerName])

The following Falcon LogScale query detects the result.txt file with credentials in %TMP%:

// Result file with credentials for Daolpu stealer (CSA-240838)
"event_platform"="Win" | #event_simpleName = "FileOpenInfo" | FileName = "result.txt" | FilePath = /\\Device\\HarddiskVolume\d+\\Windows\\Temp\\$/

Indicators of Compromise (IOCs)

This table details the IOCs related to the information provided in this report.

Description	IOC
Word document SHA256 hash	803727ccdf441e49096f3fd48107a5fe55c56c080f46773cd649c9e55ec1be61
Macro download URL	http[:]//172.104.160[.]126:8099/payload2.txt
Second-stage file SHA256 hash	5eaf0f1c1d23f4372e24eb15ee969552c416a38dbc45e4f2b4af283e3bfb8721
Daolpu SHA256 hash	4ad9845e691dd415420e0c253ba452772495c0b971f48294b54631e79a22644a
Daolpu SHA256 hash	3a9323a939fbecbc6d0ceb5c1e1f3ebde91e9f186b46fdf3ba1aee03d1d41cd8
Daolpu C2 server	http[:]//172.104.160[.]126:5000/Uploadss

Table 1. IOCs

MITRE ATT&CK

This table details the tactics and techniques described in this report.

Tactic	Technique	Observable
Execution	T1204 – User Execution	The threat actor relies on users to open the Word document
Credential Access	T1555 – Credentials from Password Stores	Daolpu grabs sensitive information from browsers
Command and Control	T1071.001 – Application Layer Protocol: Web Protocols	Daolpu exfiltrates data using the HTTP protocol
Exfiltration	T1041 – Exfiltration Over C2 Channel	Daolpu exfiltrates collected data to the C2 server

Table 2. MITRE ATT&CK Table

Additional Resources

Read other blog posts from CrowdStrike Intelligence regarding the Falcon content issue:

• Falcon Sensor Content Issue from July 19, 2024, Likely Used to Target CrowdStrike Customers
• Likely eCrime Actor Uses Filenames Capitalizing on July 19, 2024, Falcon Sensor Content Issues in Operation Targeting LATAM-Based CrowdStrike Customers

 

1. https[:]//techcommunity[.]microsoft[.]com/t5/intune-customer-success/new-recovery-tool-to-help-with-crowdstrike-issue-impacting/ba-p/4196959